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THE NUREMBERG WAR-CRIMES TRIAL
OTTO PANNENBECKER*
A participant in the proceedings of the International Military
Tribunal against persons and organizations accused of being
Nazi war criminals, I would like to attempt to interpret the
legal procedure and the maxims of law applied to these proceedings
from the viewpoint of a defense counsel and as an observer of the
events which have occurred in the seventeen years since the trial.
The International Military Tribunal was created by the so-called
London Agreement. By this agreement, the Allied nations decided
to create an international tribunal to charge and sentence those per-
sons and organizations allegedly responsible for the war crimes. The
Tribunal consisted of four judges, one from each of the Allied coun-
tries (U.S.A., Great Britain, U.S.S.R., and France), and the same
number of alternates.
Before this court, the Allied nations indicted those persons and
organizations which were considered to be principally responsible for
planning and waging a world-wide war of aggression, war crimes
and crimes against humanity committed before and during the war.
The Tribunal was not trying the members of an overthrown admin-
istration to account for crimes committed by its own people, but was
attempting to determine the responsibility of German persons and
organizations for crimes perpetrated against other countries and peo-
ples. The only areas in which the Tribunal took cognizance of the
repression of the German people were those in which German citi-
zens were executed for holding different political and philosophical
attitudes for being Jews. Such repression was considered equivalent
to preparation for aggressive warfare. The significance of this limi-
tation is seen in the fact that the S.A., or Storm Troopers, was not
officially declared to be a criminal organization, although-especially
in the beginning of Nazism-it was particularly active in persecuting
Jews. At that time, this persecution was not recognized by the S.A.
as being linked to the planning of a war of aggression but was "only"
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anti-Semitism which was not an indictable count before the military
tribunal.
Here begins the criticism of a defense counsel who, at the end of
the war, was convinced of the advisability of extensively criticizing
and accusing the entire political behavior of the defendants. This
criticism extends to the handling of the defendants' attitude toward
their own people which was not treated and administered any less
criminally than has been the case with other peoples after they are
conquered. The fact that the legal procedure was restricted to dealing
with crimes against other peoples evoke; the impression that the Nazi
crimes were exclusively aimed at foreign countries. This impression
was increased by the length of the proceedings, eleven months, and
the almost daily press reports all over the world. It is nevertheless
the fact that Nazism began with oppressing the supporters of devi-
ating opinions, religions or races within its own people. The Nazis
did not start to oppress foreign peoples and treat them inhumanly
until they oppressed the "other Germany," including the German
Jews, by use of force, sly acting and terror.
The trial before the International Military Tribunal was conducted
according to the Anglo-Saxon system which differs greatly from the
so-called Continental system used in France and Germany. There are
clearly noticeable differences between t1he two procedures. In either
system, the prosecution lodges the indictment and announces wit-
nesses, documents and further evidence which serves a basis for pros-
ecuting. In the Continental system, it is chiefly the judge who leads
the further procedure. He receives the legal documents and has al-
ready read them before the trial opens. Thus, he knows the evidence
given by the witnesses previously interrogated by the police and also
the documents regarded as evidence. In the Continental system, the
judge dominates the trial by examining tlhe defendant as to his person
and the accusations of the charge, and personally questions the wit-
nesses. The only right reserved to the prosecutor and the defense
counsel is to put further questions to the witnesses. Furthermore,
they can move for witnesses to be summoned, either for the prose-
cution or for the defense. These witnesses will first of all be ex-
amined by the judge, allowing only additional questions to be asked
both by the prosecutor and the defense counsel. In the Anglo-Saxon
system, on the other hand, the prosecutor is responsible for the thor-
ough questioning of the witnesses for t he prosecution, whereas the
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defense counsel examines the witnesses for the defense, with each
having the right to cross-examine the witnesses for the other side.
'The presiding judge of the court confines himself to conducting
procedure and deciding whether certain questions put to witnesses
are permissible when an objection to them is raised by the opposing
counsel. The court may ask additional questions, but it leaves the
details of conducting the examination to the prosecutor and the de-
fense counsel respectively. Judging the evidence is the concern of
the court which decides the issue by giving a sentence of "guilty"
or "not guilty."
It is hard to define which of the two systems is more successful
in crystallizing the truth in the most reliable way. Either procedure
has a great many pros and cons. As to the application of the Anglo-
Saxon system at Nuremberg, there was no disadvantage for those
accused before the Tribunal. Moreover, the defendant is never en-
titled to demand a particular procedure to be used in his case. He
always has the right to be tried justly, but this right is completely
guaranteed by both the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental system.
A much more serious objection, however, is raised by the indict-
ment of planning, preparing and waging a war of aggression which
was lodged against the defendants. Such an indictment constitutes a
violation of laws existing in constitutional civilized states. These laws
ensure that nobody shall be charged with a crime not already subject
to legal punishment at the time of perpetration. This axiom, existing
in all civilized countries, says that penal laws are not permitted to be
applied retroactively. The crime of planning and waging wars of
aggression does not exist and has never existed in German law, nor
do I think that such laws are included in the American, British or
French penal codes. War of aggression was declared to be a punish-
able act by the London Agreement so that the persons and organi-
zations accused before the Tribunal could be punished. Thus, the
newly created charge constitutes a violation of laws existing in all
civilized states and violates the guaranteed legal rights of the citizen,
rights according to which nobody shall be charged with violation of
such penal laws as those not yet in existence at the time of the act
in question.
In my pleading, I insistently but vainly pointed out to the court
that this, in my opinion, constituted an obvious violation of the law.
It may be mentioned in this connection that the Nazi government en-
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acted and applied certain penal laws retroactively. This was de-
nounced by the prosecuting body of the Tribunal, and rightly so!
The Nuremberg judgment has variously been called a "foundation of
new international law" and a "revolutionary deed." It is still question-
able whether it is permissible to apply nc:w international law and rev-
olutionary deeds as penal laws to such persons as those who were
ignorant of such a potential legal status when acting.
Abstractly, the Nuremberg trials show that only one of the accused
persons-R. Hess (Hitler's so-called deputy)-would have been ac-
quitted by the court had it rejected this dubious and illegal accusation.
Hess was the only defendant sentenced exclusively for planning and
waging a war of aggression. All other persons and organizations were
accused of other crimes in other counts of the judgment. Therefore,
limiting the judgment to examining war crimes and crimes against
humanity would not have prevented the other defendants from being
sentenced. From this point of view, it is justified to add that the de-
fendant Hess might well have been sentenced unjustly. No damage
would have been done if this psychopath or lunatic who had gone to
Britain by plane in the beginning of the war and was taken prisoner,
had been acquitted.
In support of the fact that the crime of war of aggression is not a
new episode in international law is seen by the fact that the Charter
of the United Nations does not include the principals of the Nurem-
berg judgment as far as this particular cr:ime is concerned nor is indi-
vidual responsibility for the crime of war of aggression found. The
generally composed "confirmation" of the Nuremberg principles by
two resolutions issued by the United Nations in 1946 and 1947 has
failed to yield any practical result and it is also acknowledged in
Anglo-Saxon literature on international law.
Not only was the accusation of the crime of war of aggression a
failure and not justified under the effective penal and international
law, but there were also misgivings regarding the method used in
dealing with the aggressive war on Poland which was conducted by
the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. The agreement between Nazi
Germany and the Soviet Union on the partition of Poland between
the two countries after Poland's conquest was concluded in August,
1939, which was prior to the war of aggression against Poland. It was
not until 1945 that the Allies, including the Soviet Union, were able
to charge the defendants with war of aggression against Poland before
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the Tribunal with the Soviet Union being both a judge and accom-
plice. It must be mentioned, despite this fact, that the court conducted
the procedure justly. The court endeavoured to impartially clarify
the difficult counts, in view of decisions of the admissibility of certain
evidence and objections by the prosecution or the defense. The evi-
dence was approved or rejected, depending on the relevance or irrele-
vance for final judgment. It is self-evident that the question of the
relevance of certain points maintained by the prosecution or the de-
fense, or the question if such points could be proved properly by
certain evidence was often not an easy one to decide. Interpretation
on the part of the parties involved differed frequently.
The following examples are included to show the endeavour of the
court to reach fair and objective judgment of the points mentioned
above: The court followed the practice of allowing depositions, or
affidavits, only in case of persons who were not able to appear or who
could not appear without severe difficulties. When evidence was of
minor importance to the essential counts of the trial and was only
illustrative and supplemental to the fundamental pieces of evidence,
depositions could be taken. This held true, for instance, for the extent
of pillage of art treasures in the Eastern war zone, or for details on
concentration camps, both of which could very well be depicted by
affidavits. However, for clarifying important questions of the trial, it
was necessary for the witnesses to appear personally before the court
so that they could be cross-examined by the opposite party to find the
truth in statements by certain representations or to shake the credibil-
ity of witnesses by presenting facts which the witnesses had then to
admit.
A good example of the use of affidavits is seen in the case of Field
Marshal Paulus. The Soviet prosecution produced an affidavit by
Paulus, the commander of the Sixth German Army during the battle
of Stalingrad who was taken prisoner of war and held in Soviet cus-
tody, which formed part of the Russian charge against the head of the
High Command of the Wehrmacht, Field Marshal Keitel. Keitel's de-
fense counsel objected to this affidavit because of the importance of
the witness. The Soviet prosecutor pointed out the difficulty of sum-
moning the witness and asked for the admittance of the affidavit. The
Tribunal rejected the affidavit and summoned the witness. The prose-
cution answered that the witness was staying in Nuremberg and
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could be examined within a few minutes. Thus, the defense counsel
was given the opportunity to cross-examine the witness thoroughly.
Another example was the introduction. by the defense of an agree-
ment between the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union and Germany,
Molotov and von Ribbentrop, on August 23, 1939, fixing the mu-
tual fields of interest in Poland in the event Poland was partitioned,
which was soon thereafter attacked by Germany. The Soviet prose-
cution fiercely resisted the admittance of this document which was so
important for the historical development of World War II. This re-
sistance was backed by untrue arguments that the documents were
forgeries and merely a means of Nazi propaganda. The document was
finally admitted despite Soviet opposition, and it proved that Germany
and the Soviet Union had actually fixed their mutual interests in the
occupied areas in Poland, prior to the conquering of that country. In
the judgment regarding the war of aggression against Poland, there is
nevertheless only one sentence on this point: "The defendant von
Ribbentrop had been sent to Moscow to conclude a non-aggression
pact with the Soviet Union."
That the prosecution was able to succeed was not surprising since
the evidence provided by witnesses and the documents were in many
cases damning. Hitler and his accomplices and underlings divulged
their intention of initiating a war of conquest in numerous documents.
Most of these documents have been preserved, since they were secret
minutes of conferences of top leaders of the Nazi party and of Hit-
ler's speeches before the commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht.
The documents also show the increase of rigidity in exercising power
and oppression on the German people by force and the suppression
of any opposition within the country by imposing death sentences or
imprisoning people in penitentiaries and concentration camps. The
purpose of this oppression was two-fold: to make the exercise of power
in Germany absolute, and to maintain a firm grip on both the organ-
ization of the Wehrmacht and the majority of those unable to make a
carefully considered political decision being liable to instigation and
political passion.
The problem of propaganda by demagogues cannot be dealt with in
this connection. As far as Nazism is concerned, the Nuremberg war
trial has proved that a clever demagogue can direct the mass as he de-
sires and bring them to heel by ostensibly high-principled aims and
ideals. Thus, he can kindle the low instincts of cruelty and make them
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useful for his purposes. Nearly all revolutions and authoritarian sys-
tems set examples for the truth of that, as well as religious witch hunts
from the Middle Ages to Modern Times, so-called "lynch laws" in
the United States, and the torturing of people of different races in
Algeria and the Congo. These examples make it obvious that the dis-
ease of mass hysteria is not yet extinct and that there is little hope for
a change within a measurable space of time. The elite of a people has
sufficient education, culture and ideals to stay clear of such hysteria.
Nevertheless, the trial in Nuremberg has made it evident that even a
considerable part of that elite fell victim to the very same mass hys-
teria. Others again recognized Nazism sooner or later by its mislead-
ing catchwords and saw its evil. In spite of that, opportunism caused
them to follow the Nazi leaders. The fact that a good number of per-
sons in Germany and other countries were aware of the felonious and
inhumane aims of Nazism in the trial was irrelevant.
In every war, individual persons as well as whole groups commit
the most horrible crimes, as was seen in the recent war in Algeria.
However, what was so extraordinarily shocking about Nazi warfare
is the fact that those crimes were centrally organized and ordered on a
large and detailed scale. Examples of such atrocities are the transpor-
tation of doomed Jews, the utilization of their belongings as well as
the concealment by camouflage of the purpose of these transportations
as alleged evacuations, and the gas chambers disguised as lavatories and
shower rooms. Nuremberg has demonstrated this system was one of
mass murder, the like of which has probably never existed in such a
meticulously planned and detailed way.
On the other hand, it is correct, but of no consequence, that a few
crimes for which the Nazis were held responsible by the public prob-
ably were not committed by them. Thus, the tribunal investigated
thoroughly the evidence which had been submitted to prove the mur-
der of a great number of Polish officers at Katyn. This investigation
did not prove the Nazis to be guilty of murdering these officers as had
been maintained by the prosecution. The murders at Katyn were not
mentioned further in the judgment of the court. Even though men-
tioned in the indictment, the tribunal was hindered in giving a final
determination of the case because the people responsible for this mur-
der represented a nation which was a member of the tribunal and the
prosecution, a fact which suggested itself to observers at the trial in
the course of the taking of evidence.
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German law provides for the punishment of every single member
of a gang if the gang commits a punishable act like larceny or smug-
gling. Nevertheless, under German law, it is impossible for the gang
itself to be declared criminal. Hence, each member of the gang can-
not be prosecuted merely because he once belonged to an organization
declared to be criminal. Therefore, an accusation against organizations
was novel to the German defense counsel.
The prosecution labelled the following organizations criminal and
thus moved for them so to be declared: The Leadership Corps, the
Secret State Police (Gestapo); the Security Service, or S.D. (Sicher-
heitsdienst); the Elite Guard, or S.S. (Schutzstaffel); the Storm
Troopers, or S.A. (Sturmabteilung); the Reich Cabinet; the General
Staff; and the High Command of the Wehrmacht.
As to these organizations, especially the big mass organizations like
the S.A., the question of their responsibility as an organization for the
crimes of the Hitler regime was the starting point for the difficult
problem of collective guilt, a problem which cannot be depicted in a
few words. The Tribunal refused to depict the S.A. as a criminal or-
ganization, because a large number of its members were not concerned
in the criminal plans for waging a war of aggression, in the war crimes,
nor in the crime against humanity, particularly since the S.A. itself
had not been engaged in these aims. The importance of the S.A. was
already very much on the decline after the so-called "Roehm Putsch"
of June 30, 1934, which occurred before the preparation for war and
before the attended crimes reached a decisive stage. The prosecution
of the four nations had alleged the criminal character of the S.A. It is
interesting that even the Soviet member of the tribunal approved of
this decision, although he had otherwise filed a dissenting opinion on
various counts.
The Leadership Corps, on the other hand, was declared to be a
criminal organization, allowing for certain limitations regarding the
lower ranks of this organization. Also, the Gestapo and the S.D., or
Security Service, were declared to be criminal, again with certain lim-
itations, as was the S.S. or Elite Guard. In the latter case, the limita-
tion was the exclusion of persons who had been transferred without
volition on their part. This covered a number of policemen and sol-
diers. It was very difficult for these compulsory recruited persons to
prove this fact to the tribunal, because they were members of a crimi-
nal organization. The Tribunal did not always succeed in passing just
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sentences on persons who had involuntarily been incorporated as po-
licemen or soldiers into the S.S. during the war. The tribunal, for that
matter, was suspicious since many persons maintained that they had
been forced to enter the S.S. although they had done so voluntarily.
The tribunal refused to declare as criminal the German cabinet, the
General Staff, and the High Command. To this, the Soviet judge dis-
sented.
The tribunal acquitted three of the twenty-one persons accused:
Schacht, von Papen, and Fritzsche. In all these cases, the Soviet judge
dissented, and he filed an objection against sentencing the defendant
Hess to life imprisonment, holding that a sentence of death should
have been imposed. Most other defendants were sentenced to death,
while some of them were sentenced for life or to lesser prison terms.
For a defense counsel to criticize the decisions is a rather delicate
problem. I shall confine myself to saying that the sentence against the
defendant Frick, whom I represented, was well justified on grounds
of evidence. Frick, as Nazi Interior Minister, had held a controlling
position in regard to the establishment of totalitarian power in Nazi
Germany. He also played a key role in the preparation of and the
waging of war, which in turn was a relevant factor for the decision of
the tribunal. Even if Frick, in his capacity as Nazi Interior Minister,
did not personally take part in the planning and preparation of the
war or in working out the strategic plans, he was nevertheless respon-
sible for the decisive orders which entirely suppressed free expression
of opinion in Germany and helped to establish a regime of terror. He
held this position until the post was taken over by Himmler. Subse-
quently, he was appointed Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, the area
which is to a large extent identical to Czechoslovakia. Hence, he was
principally responsible for the outrages after April, 1943, a fact which
he could not reject on the ground that he was a subordinate of the
Minister of State, Frank. The problem of Frick's responsibility in his
first dominant position as Nazi Interior Minister was somewhat paral-
lel to his responsibility in the subsequent position as Protector of Bo-
hemia and Moravia. In both cases, he occupied the highest positions
and thus bore the chief responsibility. In the Nazi Ministry of the
Interior, the notorious Reichsfiihrer S.S., Himmler (chief of the Ger-
man police), was placed under him. Yet, Himmler did not feel himself
bound by any of Frick's instructions. His superior position in the
N.S.D.A.P. (National Socialist German Worker's Party) and his in-
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fluence with Hitler caused him to disregard Frick when he gave in-
structions to the police assigned to the Nazi Ministry of the Interior.
A similar position was taken by the Minister of State, Frank, who was
able to arrange for any cruelty whatsoever within the area of Czecho-
slovakia without having to ask Frick, the Protector. The tribunal
justly charged Frick with entering upon both of the above-mentioned
posts voluntarily, and the charges were substantiated by numerous
laws and decrees carrying his personal signature, documents support-
ing to a large extent the criminal regime of Hitler and his party, even
if Frick himself had never taken part in individual actions.
I would like to say on grounds of personal knowledge that Frick
was the kind of official who could have signed any measure that pro-
moted the Nazi politicians' aims. He ignored the outcome of those
measures, comfortably conscious of acting in the name and interest of
the Fuehrer, who had accepted the sole responsibility for all measures.
Because of this, he failed to understand, as did other defendants, that
the indictment, as well as the proceedings, could put the blame for
acting criminally on him because the government, in the person of
Hitler, had taken all responsibility. Since he had not been guilty of
any personal infringement, never murdered a Jew and always acted
within the scope of the legality of the Nazi regime, he regarded him-
self as an official who has always remained loyal to his "Highest Mas-
ter." Even during the course of the trial, he still believed for quite
awhile that the prosecution would not be able to prove any personal
crime of his and would therefore have to acquit him.
The Nuremberg trials have shed light on the point that a positive
attitude toward the law cannot go so far as to allow and justify every-
thing that is covered by a regime's formal legality. Critical apprecia-
tion of state laws and regulations, taking at least obvious crimes as
standard, is imperative for every citizen or soldier, allowing for dif-
ferences and varying views on the question if and on what condition
formal orders by superiors have to be obeyed. Taking crimes as stand-
ard, neither law nor orders are compulsory, and the Nuremberg trials
have proved that it is not always the most advantageous way to ignore
all misgivings and calm conscience by the thought that the law is for-
mally faultless or the order has been given by competent superiors,
even if criminal acts are involved.
As for outlawing war of aggression as a crime, the proceedings of
Nuremberg might therefore have been, despite all good wishes, actu-
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ally only an episode which has not been followed by vigorous devel-
opment of criminal and international law, stamping it as a crime. The
Nuremberg trials have, in that respect, been a disappointment for the
future. It remains, however, a symbol of warning, because statesmen
and their adherents cannot excuse themselves for crimes by stating that
the acts in question have been ordered and are covered by the leader
or the leading party. The men accused in Nuremberg were not able
to protect themselves from being sentenced before the international
court by such excuses, and no more than the S.S. leaders, physicians
and officials who are even now being charged in Germany with in-
human behavior in concentration and extermination camps in Au-
schwitz and at other places. No judge accepted such an excuse for the
defendants, rightly so, and it is to be hoped, for all the time to come.
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